Imagine America faces a crisis of malnutrition. Millions of Americans are consuming too many processed foods and too few fresh foods. To stem the crisis, Congress enacts a comprehensive food reform law, requiring food sellers to meet minimum nutritional standards and provide access to healthy foods. The new law makes food more expensive, and many Americans opt out of the food market altogether, choosing to grow their own food instead. The food industry teeters on the verge of collapse. To prevent this collapse, Congress passes another law mandating that individuals buy a minimum amount of healthy food each month. Individuals who fail to buy the minimum amount face a stiff penalty.

Can Congress do this? Does the Constitution give the federal government power to make you buy healthy food? These questions are the heart of the Obamacare lawsuits—merely substitute “health insurance” for “healthy food.” If Obamacare’s health insurance mandate is upheld—as the federal Sixth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in late June—individual liberty is in serious long-term jeopardy.

The rationale behind forcing individuals to buy health insurance versus healthy food is indistinguishable. The Obama Administration contends that, if people aren’t forced to buy health insurance, the market will collapse. Because Obamacare made health insurance more expensive—doing things like forbidding insurers from excluding those with preexisting conditions—many Americans, particularly healthy young people, would have decided to stay out of the health insurance market altogether and “self-insure.” Government must force these people to buy health insurance, the argument goes, to capture their premium dollars and help subsidize older, sicker people, keeping the overall market affordable and viable.

No matter how ardently you believe the health care system is flawed, or how angry you are at insurance companies, you must resist the temptation to let these considerations distract you from the broader and critically important constitutional choice posed by the health reform litigation. At stake are two related constitutional concepts: “federalism” and “limited and enumerated powers.” These concepts aren’t just quaint, outdated relics. They aren’t about “states’ rights.” They are both designed to protect individual liberty by restraining government’s innate tendency toward ever-expanding power.

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Today the Institute for Justice filed opening briefs in our fourth case to appear before the U.S. Supreme Court.

IJ’s first trip to the high court came in 2002 and resulted in a landmark victory for school choice.  We also won our second U.S. Supreme Court case, defending the American ideals of economic liberty and unfettered interstate commerce by striking down a ban on the direct shipment of wine.

Our third case changed America forever.  A local government in Connecticut decided to bulldoze an entire neighborhood and hand the land over to a politically connected private developer.  The law was stacked against the property owners in favor of the powerful special interests.  IJ, defending the property owners, lost in a controversial 5-4 ruling.

This was the infamous Kelo case, and it resulted in an explosion of outrage and grassroots activism all across the country.  Ed Morrissey recently wrote at Hot Air that it arguably set “the stage for the all-out eruption of Tea Party activism a few years later.” This epic battle to protect private property rights, ultimately vindicated by grassroots activists just like you, is one that will never be forgotten:

And now, as children nationwide get ready to begin a new school year, the Institute for Justice is defending Arizona’s innovative scholarship tax-credit program before the highest court in the land.

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To the People of the State of New York:

THE Constitution proposed by the convention may be considered under two general points of view. The FIRST relates to the sum or quantity of power which it vests in the government, including the restraints imposed on the States. The SECOND, to the particular structure of the government, and the distribution of this power among its several branches.

Under the FIRST view of the subject, two important questions arise: 1. Whether any part of the powers transferred to the general government be unnecessary or improper? 2. Whether the entire mass of them be dangerous to the portion of jurisdiction left in the several States?

Is the aggregate power of the general government greater than ought to have been vested in it? This is the FIRST question.

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The Senate is debating the future of American health care, yet one very important issue has yet to get a full and fair debate.  Is the individual mandate that forces citizens to purchase health care insurance a constitutional power of the federal government?  When House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Ca.) was asked this question, she answered with the non sequitur “are you serious?”  Conservatives who respect the idea that the constitution maps out a federal government with limited powers would answer with a loud — “Hell No.”

The Heritage Foundation and the American Center for Law & Justice (ACLJ) recently released legal analysis calling into serious question the constitutionality of the Congress’s plan to force all citizens to purchase health insurance.  These conservative institutions argue that the unprecedented idea, a mandate that all Americans be forced into a contractual agreement with a private party for health insurance, is not a constitutionally permissible activity by the federal government.  My sources tell me that this issue will be raised during the Senate debate on ObamaCare very soon and may open another front in the war against ObamaCare.  (more…)

THE SECOND class of powers, lodged in the general government, consists of those which regulate the intercourse with foreign nations, to wit: to make treaties; to send and receive ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations; to regulate foreign commerce, including a power to prohibit, after the year 1808, the importation of slaves, and to lay an intermediate duty of ten dollars per head, as a discouragement to such importations.

This class of powers forms an obvious and essential branch of the federal administration. If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations.

The powers to make treaties and to send and receive ambassadors, speak their own propriety. Both of them are comprised in the articles of Confederation, with this difference only, that the former is disembarrassed, by the plan of the convention, of an exception, under which treaties might be substantially frustrated by regulations of the States; and that a power of appointing and receiving “other public ministers and consuls,” is expressly and very properly added to the former provision concerning ambassadors. The term ambassador, if taken strictly, as seems to be required by the second of the articles of Confederation, comprehends the highest grade only of public ministers, and excludes the grades which the United States will be most likely to prefer, where foreign embassies may be necessary. And under no latitude of construction will the term comprehend consuls. Yet it has been found expedient, and has been the practice of Congress, to employ the inferior grades of public ministers, and to send and receive consuls. It is true, that where treaties of commerce stipulate for the mutual appointment of consuls, whose functions are connected with commerce, the admission of foreign consuls may fall within the power of making commercial treaties; and that where no such treaties exist, the mission of American consuls into foreign countries may PERHAPS be covered under the authority, given by the ninth article of the Confederation, to appoint all such civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United States. But the admission of consuls into the United States, where no previous treaty has stipulated it, seems to have been nowhere provided for. A supply of the omission is one of the lesser instances in which the convention have improved on the model before them. But the most minute provisions become important when they tend to obviate the necessity or the pretext for gradual and unobserved usurpations of power. A list of the cases in which Congress have been betrayed, or forced by the defects of the Confederation, into violations of their chartered authorities, would not a little surprise those who have paid no attention to the subject; and would be no inconsiderable argument in favor of the new Constitution, which seems to have provided no less studiously for the lesser, than the more obvious and striking defects of the old. (more…)