The fact that Paul Krugman received the Nobel Prize in economics makes sense given that both Al Gore and Obama received the Nobel Peace Prize. But that is the only way that it makes sense.

In his December 29^th column in the New York Times, Keynes Was Right, he continues to make the case that the only reason we haven’t come roaring out of the Great Recession is because we spent too little.

Krugman cites the downturn of 1937 when FDR’s government programs were curtailed and unemployment rose. He says that unlike in that fateful year we should instead redouble our efforts and spend more to prime the economic pump. Austerity is insanity he says. We must spend more as Keynes would have advised, deficits (and inflation) be damned.

Build pyramids as Keynes said we should. So what if the they do not contribute, and probably detract, from the quality of the economy. It is the quantity of economic activity that we are interested in not quality. Get people employed doing whatever. This is the road to prosperity!

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I’ve commented many times about the misguided big-government policies of both Hoover and FDR, so I can say with considerable admiration that this new video from the Center for Freedom and Prosperity packs an amazing amount of solid info into about five minutes.

Perhaps the most surprising revelation in the video, at least to everyone other than economic historians, is that America suffered a harsh depression after World War I, with GDP falling by a staggering 24 percent.

But we don’t read much about that downturn in the history books, in large part because it ended so quickly.

The key question, though, is why did that depression end quickly while the Great Depression dragged on for a decade? (more…)

With the 2008 “Credit Crisis” bursting the global housing bubble; the United States led and the world followed with the massive amounts of government spending and money-printing stimulus promoted by “Keynesian” economists. To stem the crashes in prices on stock and commodity exchanges and a run on European banks, the U.S. Federal Reserve enlisted the world’s central banks in a coordinated drenching of the earth in vast amounts of freshly printed cash.

But as the crisis waned and the “Great Recession” began, governments and their central banks continued to pour wave after wave of Keynesian deficit spending and money printing. With economic activity about to slow and austerity shrinking excess government spending, the citizens of the world are about to be rewarded for their trust in government with a steep recession coupled with high levels of inflation. Economists refer to this witch’s brew of escalating misery as stagflation.

The U.S. Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, Bank of Japan, and other central banks around the world expanded money supplies by purchasing $2.5 trillion of sovereign debt and distressed banking assets to stem the risk of a deflationary spiral; from this, resultant lower wages and higher unemployment led to a self-reinforcing decline in global consumption. (more…)

Now we’re begging: Will someone PLEASE bring back Glass-Steagall? The Glass-Steagall Act was, of course, the legislation passed in the early 1930s in response to a certain banking crisis that led to a particular Great Depression. Among other things, the Act erected a “Chinese wall” between a financial institution’s investment banking and merchant banking functions. In less complicated terms, the law forced banks to separate any business it was transacting on behalf of clients from the speculative moves it made with its own money. For the layman: banks can’t make dumb bets with clients’ money.

Sort of makes sense, doesn’t it?

Well apparently it seemed a bit stingy for President Clinton and the Republicans in Congress in 1999. We have Senator Phil Gramm and Representative Jim Leach to thank for that one. Here’s the problem: The heads of big banks have this terrible habit of thinking that they’re the smartest guys in the room. Anyone who doesn’t believe that need only watch Ben Bernanke talk for more than 30 seconds. Actually, let’s refine that a bit. The problem isn’t that banking executives think they’re savants, the real problem is that they aren’t.

In the modern financial age, a lot of very highly paid guys with impressive titles who look at way too many numbers and think they make sense have concocted some very complex “hedging” strategies for “managing risk.” They think they understand the crafty derivatives they’ve invented – which are completely unregulated and totally opaque – and all the counterparty risk involved. They don’t, and therein lies the rub.

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When I introduced the concept of regime uncertainty in 1997, attempting to improve our understanding of the Great Depression’s extraordinary duration, I anticipated that many people—especially my fellow economists—would not welcome this contribution. Their primary objection, I ventured, would be that the concept remained too vague and, most of all, that it had not been reduced to a quantitative index of the sort that modern mainstream economists customarily work with, especially in their empirical macroeconomic analyses.

My argument did not lack evidence, however, and I regarded the agreement of several different forms of evidence as an important element of the argument’s force. The evidence I adduced with regard to changes in the yield spreads for high-grade corporate bonds of differing maturities seemed to me both systematic and especially compelling, though not decisive because alternative explanations of those changes might be offered. (I considered several such explanations and rejected them as unpersuasive in one way or another.) Recently, in my application of the concept of regime uncertainty to help us understand better the persistent economic troubles since 2007, I again advanced several different kinds of evidence, including as before an analysis of changes in the yield curves for high-grade corporate bonds. This time, too, the evidence is consistent with the underlying argument.

Nevertheless, the argument scarcely gained widespread assent, and most analysts either ignored it completely or, like Paul Krugman, dismissed it as a fairy tale—in his view, the sort of wholly fictitious notion that would be peddled only by think-tank whores in the pay of Republican plutocrats. (I trust that everyone who knows me will see how closely I fit this template.)

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America is in shambles from sea to shining sea. Unemployment is at Great Depression levels. Real Estate is collapsing. The stock market is crumbling. Retail sales are vanishing. Consumer confidence is plummeting. Inflation is skyrocketing (on the products that matter- energy and food prices). And of course, our U.S. Triple A credit rating is gone for the first time in history.

America is staring at economic disaster- Obamageddon. We are the Titanic, headed straight for the iceberg. Even delusional 500 point up days on Wall Street will not change the frightening long term picture. The iceberg is straight ahead.

Obama and his socialist cabal have channeled Hoover and FDR, who turned an ordinary bust into The Great Depression with a toxic strategy of more government, more spending, more debt, more entitlements, more rules and regulations strangling business, higher minimum wages, more power to unions, higher taxes, more printing of money by Fed, and trade tariffs. This is the Obama blueprint squared.

Here’s where the story gets downright frightening. This time the results are going to be dramatically worse than 1929. This time we are facing The Greatest Depression ever. Obamageddon.

Why? Because The Great Depression had NONE of problems and obligations we are now facing.

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Someone must have imagined that my hopes for improved economic understanding might be excessively optimistic and thus needed to be curbed to restore my normal emotional balance, because that person undertook to smash any such hopes to dust by e-mailing me a link to a Huffington Post article by Paul Abrams, “Economically, World War II Was Stimulus on Steroids.” This screed turns out to be an ostensible macroeconomics lesson composed in equal measure of economic foolishness, historical ignorance, and ideological tendentiousness — the veritable epitome of a worse-than-worthless contribution to public enlightenment.

The opening paragraphs indicate the direction of Abrams’s argument:

The next time someone argues that the New Deal failed, and only the Second World War ended the Depression, as ‘proof’ that government spending does not work, one can respond with the details of economic growth and unemployment reduction up to 1940, or one can ignore the claim and thank them for making your case for massive government spending in a deep, broad recession.

Right wing politicians are loathe to credit the New Deal with any success in hoisting the United States out of the Great Depression, but credit World War II for that achievement, believing that that somehow disproves Keynesian economic theory.

That claim, however, undermines their entire premise.

Abrams concludes that “massive government spending at a time of severe economic downturn and dislocation can indeed get an economy humming again,” as World War II shows; the New Deal was merely too timid. He seems unaware that his argument merely restates the fallacy-ridden hodge-podge of conventional wisdom about how World War II “got the economy out of the Depression” that has dominated the thinking of economists, historians, and the public ever since the war itself.

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For weeks, we have been treated to comic opera in D.C.’s theater of the politically and economically absurd. On the stage, the actors—President Obama, the Secretary of the Treasury, congressional leaders—hop about, shouting moronic lines about the national “default” that will occur unless the government’s statutory debt limit is raised, reciting Chicken Little lines about how such a default will trigger worldwide economic catastrophe. According to a report in the July 5th issue of the Christian Science Monitor,

Facing an Aug. 2 deadline, Congress and the White House are stepping up face time to avert what the Treasury Department has called “catastrophic economic and market consequences” of a default on the national debt.

Think about this statement. Have governments defaulted in the past? Of course, they have, on hundreds of occasions over the centuries. Have these defaults triggered “catastrophic economic and market consequences”? No. When a government defaults, there are consequences, of course, including heightened reluctance of lenders to lend to the deadbeat government in the future or at least to lend at such favorable interest rates. Often partial payments of principal and interest are arranged or debts are restructured. The world keeps spinning.

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Despite the astonishing flood of more than a trillion dollars in new commercial-bank reserves that the Fed created in late 2008 and early 2009, when it undertook to rescue the big banks and other institutions from the consequences of their boom-time mistakes, Ben Bernanke has insisted that the Fed can and will contain this inflationary potential, and he has emphasized that inflation remains under control, indeed, that potential deflation presents the greater danger. He rests his case on the evidence of standard macroeconomic indexes.

Standard measures of the money stock, for example, have not increased greatly. The year-to-year change (ending in January 2011) in M2 was only 4.3 percent; the two-year change, only 6.4 percent. For MZM (money zero maturity), the corresponding rates of change were 2.6 percent and 4.4 percent, respectively. Thus, it would appear that by historical standards money has grown quite moderately in the past two years.

Bernanke and his supporting cast of monetary economists can also point to corroborating evidence that by historical standards the rate of inflation has been modest. The year-to-year change (ending in January 2011) in the all-items consumer price index (CPI) was only 1.7 percent; the two-year change, only 4.3 percent. The implicit price deflator for GDP, the broadest of all price indexes, reveals even less inflation. This index, which is computed on a quarterly basis, shows a one-year change of only 1.4 percent for the year ending in the fourth quarter of 2010, and a corresponding two-year change of only 1.8 percent.

(I have computed all of the figures mentioned in this article from basic data available at the website maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.)

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Consider the following commentary on the economic situation:

Foolhardy procedures which are divorced from economic realities, or whose economic implications are not understood by their promoters, do not perforce become sanctified and wise merely by designating them as “action”; tilting at windmills does not draw water.

[W]hen a recovery program, which, while it may appear effective, depends for its efficacy upon much the same kind of “cheap money” inflation which . . . was the main cause of the recession from 2007 to 2009, then the present recovery must ultimately prove as illusory as the boom from 2001 to 2007, and it is the duty of economists to pierce the veil of illusion.

Certainly the recovery movement to the date of this writing [December 2010] is a peculiar one: it is shot through with anomalies. With [more than 15 million estimated to be] unemployed . . . with governmental relief rolls still at high levels, . . . there very obviously is something wrong, somewhere.

The fact would seem to be that the authorities who are undertaking the “management” of the current recovery, and congratulating themselves that prosperity is returning because they “planned it so,” are utterly oblivious of the fact that recovery is being engineered largely by the same means which produced the last boom – and recession. With this difference: whereas the banking system during the recent boom was producing an investment credit inflation by extending credit to business men and corporations, Government is now assuming the role of inducing new deposit currency in the banking system and thereby producing a consumption credit inflation. The Federal Government, instead of private corporations, is issuing the bonds which the banks are now purchasing, thereby inflating the deposit currency structure all over again. These “created” funds are in this instance being used principally to finance consumption expenditures through relief disbursements, make-work projects, and the like. . . . [T]he current inflation tends to conceal and to preserve the fundamental disequilibria which so prolonged the recession after 2007 and which we are now carrying over therefrom without having once squarely faced the problem of correcting them.

Notice, however, that the foregoing commentary, except for the terms in bold font, was written not yesterday, but, in its final form, in 1937. The authors, C. A. Phillips, T. F. McManus, and R. W. Nelson, placed this commentary, along with a wealth of related evidence and analysis, in their unjustly neglected book Banking and the Business Cycle: A Study of the Great Depression in the United States (New York: Macmillan, 1937). The quoted passages, which appear on pp. 212-14, originally read as follows:

Foolhardy procedures which are divorced from economic realities, or whose economic implications are not understood by their promoters, do not perforce become sanctified and wise merely by designating them as “action”; tilting at windmills does not draw water.

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The Great Recession officially ended way back in June of 2009, so why are so many Americans still out of work?

It’s not because politicians were twiddling their thumbs. Indeed, from from bailouts to “Cash for Clunkers” to the massive stimulus plan, government has busied itself with trying to fix the economy. And, according to President Obama, this “bold, persistent, experimentation” has brought our country back from the brink.

Obama borrows that phrase from President Franklin Rooselvelt, and today’s president has a lot in common with the original bold, persistent, experimenter. Like Obama, FDR was a charismatic Democrat who replaced an unpopular Republican during a time of crisis. And like Obama, FDR championed a slew of policies designed to get America back to work.

Today many Americans credit FDR with rescuing our nation from the Great Depression, but there’s plenty wrong with that view, says Lee Ohanian, a UCLA economics professor who specializes in economic crisis.

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In a report sure to cause consternation at the White House and in the offices of the Democratic Leadership in Congress, “60 Minutes” provided an in-depth report on the realities of the unemployment situation in America today.

When you take into account the underemployed as well as the unemployed, the national rate hits 17% and California a staggering 22%.

To put a face on the realities of the underemployed in America under Obamanomincs, reporter Scott Pelley spoke with a fiber-optics engineering manager who has been looking for work for over a year.  He just took a job working at a Target.   20% of the unemployed in America have college degrees.

According to the report, 1/3 of the unemployed have been out of work for over a year.  This hasn’t happenned since the Great Depression.

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As a professional scholar, Ben Bernanke devoted much of his academic life to studying the Great Depression. It is no surprise then, that the cause of the Depression was of particular interest to the current Fed chairman. In the end, Bernanke surmised that it wasn’t so much a particular action that caused the greatest economic downturn the world has ever seen, but a period of inaction, specifically, the time between the crash of 1929 and the beginning of FDR’s New Deal in 1933. He proposed that government was far too slow in taking steps to stabilize the economy and as a result, it took a massive public works program and World War to eventually jump-start the country.

Convinced as he was, when faced with a similar situation he was determined not to make the same mistake as his predecessors. In short, he was determined to stop the markets from failing. Together with Henry Paulson, they provided the framework for the $700 billion bailout of American banks, designed to infuse the market with fresh capital while making the US government a shareholder in the biggest financial institutions in the country.

Fast forward two years and a few things have changed. The majority of the $700 billion has been paid back but the spending hasn’t stopped, nor does Bernanke expect it to. In fact, he expects the United States to enter an extended period of recession, ala Japan since the 1990’s. Coincidentally, Bernanke is an expert of the Japanese economy as well, having studied the rise and fall of the Asian superpower and even lectured at their central bank about how they should have handled the bursting of their real estate bubble.

For a man who wields such an incredible power over the economy, much is expected and demanded. Without getting into my overall opinion of the Federal Bank, I want to talk about what the Fed is doing today to bring an end to this recession. Let me warn you, it is has little to do with real reform and everything to do with regulation and mind games.

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“The middle class is still treading water, while those aspiring to reach the middle class are doing everything they can to keep from drowning.”

—President Barack Obama, 8 September 2010

Bad metaphors bring bad policies. During the Great Depression Americans were told that “the pump” had to be “primed.” Despite twelve years of pump-priming, F. D. R. did not bring America out of the Depression. Bipartisan tax cuts targeted against Truman’s “Fair Deal” did.

Roosevelt had also used the metaphor of “war,” but that analogy was brought to perfection in L. B. J.’s “war on poverty.” The image is problematic. Marines going into a battle, for example, want to know, as they are locking and loading, who the “bad guys” are, that is, whom to shoot. Who were the bad guys in the “war on poverty”? The impoverished? The rich? When President Obama took office a year and a half ago, the universal call from the Democrats was to pass a stimulus package in order to “jump start” economy. Is the American economy really an old jalopy whose owner would not dare go out for a drive without taking his jumper cables? Yet that image was invoked countless times without a trace of irony as the government was moving in to take over parts of the auto industry.

If bad political metaphors are not exposed, bad policies invariably follow. That is why one of the most important moments in the debate over independence was when Thomas Paine required the American colonists to rethink the idea of Britain as the “mother country.” Does a mother send an army to attack her young? Do not children eventually grow up? In deciding to become a republic, Americans chose not to have a permanent parent overseeing their every move and aspiration.

Having failed to “jump start” the economy, President Obama and the Democrats are moving onto a new metaphor. The people are “drowning.” Now this is an indisputably powerful image. Who would not throw a “life line” to a person who is drowning? Only the most unfeeling capitalist on his mega yacht (about the size of John Kerry’s) would let someone go down in the treacherous waters of the present economy. When examined closely, though, the analogy reveals more than the president knows.

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Each summer, Wall Street strategist Byron Wien convenes a meeting of high rollers to discuss the outlook for investment. This year’s meeting brought together fifty individuals, including more than ten billionaires.

Their expectations, as reported by CNBC, are gloomy:

“They saw the United States in a long-term slow growth environment with the near-term risk of recession quite real,” said Wien, in a commentary to Blackstone clients. “The Obama administration was viewed as hostile to business and that discouraged both hiring and investment. Companies and entrepreneurs were reluctant to add workers because they didn’t know what their healthcare costs or taxes were going to be.”

Add this report to the many similar ones to which my colleagues and I have called attention over the past two years.

Of course, for mainstream macroeconomists, such evidence means nothing. In fact, they hold it in complete contempt because (1) their formal mathematical models do not have a variable called “regime uncertainty,” and (2) even if they could be persuaded to take this factor into account, the canned data on which they rely—the product of the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis, for the most part—do not supply them with an “official” data set for their analysis. What you can’t measure, according to their “scientific” credo, does not exist. Their de facto motto (of which I have more than once been on the receiving end) is: you’ve got no formal model; you’ve got nothing.

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Regime uncertainty has gained increasing recognition as the current economic troubles have persisted with little or no improvement since the economy reached a cyclical trough early in 2009. As described in my 1997 paper, regime uncertainty pertains to

the likelihood that investors’ private property rights in their capital and the income it yields will be attenuated further by government action. Such attenuations can arise from many sources, ranging from simple tax-rate increases, to the imposition of new kinds of taxes, to outright confiscation of private property. Many intermediate threats can arise from various sorts of regulation, for instance, of securities markets, labor markets, and product markets. In any event, the security of private property rights rests not so much on the letter of the law as on the character of the government that enforces, or threatens, presumptive rights.

In the latter half of the 1930s, many investors feared that the government would destroy the private enterprise system and replace it with fascism, socialism, or some other extreme transformation of the existing economic order.

In testing my hypothesis, I marshaled three distinct types of evidence: historical documentation of government actions and public reactions; findings of public opinion surveys, especially surveys of businessmen; and evidence from financial markets. The latter seems to some observers, especially to economists, to be the most telling because it is relatively “hard” and quantitative. In any event, it is the sort of evidence economists are accustomed to analyzing.

My most striking financial evidence for the New Deal episode pertains to the yield curve for corporate bonds, that is, to the spreads between the effective yields on high-grade corporate bonds with various terms to maturity. I found that this yield curve became suddenly much steeper sometime between the first quarter of 1934 and the first quarter of 1935 (a period when the New Deal lurched from its first, or business tolerant, phase to its second, or business hostile, phase) and remained very steep until sometime between the first quarter of 1941 and the first quarter of 1942 (a period when the New Deal handed over the reins to the military and the big businessmen who, along with the president himself, ran the war-command economy for the duration). I interpreted these extreme spreads as risk premiums on longer-term investments caused by regime uncertainty.

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Nobel Laureate Vernon Smith in The Daily Beast:

The case for government deficit spending was that idle unemployed labor and capital would be put to work to increase the output of goods and services. Hence, a dollar of government spending would produce more than a dollar of new output because of the “multiplier effect.” Robert Barro of Harvard has studied wartime and defense spending, and found a multiplier of only 0.8. But those were better times, when businesses, banks, and consumers were not primarily concerned to use new income to pay down debt or save to protect against income loss. Even in better times there wasn’t much bang for the buck.

So what has been the government’s response in the current crisis? Besides spending stimulus, it was tax incentives for new home buyers and cash for clunkers if you bought a new car. All three are programs for borrowing output, homes and cars from future production and sales. Using subsidies to pump up home sales beyond what people could afford was the problem that led to the crisis. Now the problem is touted as the solution.

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Paul Krugman has been on a roll the last two weeks. After announcing that America is in its “Third Depression” last week, he provided an encore last weekend, by blaming U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke for his concerns about the evils of deficit spending for failing to increase economic stimulation of the economy. During the Great Depression President Franklin Roosevelt brushed away concerns regarding the wisdom of deficit spending by saying; “If we can boondoggle ourselves out of this depression, that word is going to be enshrined in the hearts of the American people for years to come.” Perhaps Professor Krugman is frustrated that so many Americans have not enshrined the boondoggle of deficit spending in their hearts the same way he has.

Our good Professor just won the Nobel Prize for economics in October 2008, for his theory, that to be economically dominant, industries must concentrate their producers and suppliers into a common metropolitan area near their customers to maximize economies of scale and transportation savings. His model perfectly explained the 1950’s and 1960’s success of the U.S. auto industry’s tight concentration of assembly plants, steel foundries and parts suppliers in and around the city of Detroit; and within one days delivery to the bulk of their big city customers.

But Krugman’s theory of economic dominance through concentration has been rendered meaningless by modern supply chain management revolution that interconnects competitive vendors from across the globe. China has a massive balance of payments surplus because they can competitively ship products 10,000 miles to Detroit and beat local parts manufacturers on price and quality. Just nine months after our Nobel Laureate picked up his $1.8 million check and Norwegian hardware, General Motors, the poster child of the Professor’s industrial policy, filed the largest bankruptcy in the U.S. history in September 2009 with only $82 billion in assets, but $172 billion in debt.

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If President Obama’s Oval Office speech made one thing clear, it is that his administration and the activists who back it view the Gulf oil spill as simply an opportunity to advance their pre-existing agenda—which has nothing to do with cleaning up the Gulf, protecting the fragile coastal environment or fostering the region’s economy.

Although now overruled for the time being by a federal judge, the Obama administration’s May 27 order to stop all deep-water exploratory drilling in U.S. waters of the Gulf of Mexico for six months, pending the report of a commission investigating the causes of BP’s Deepwater Horizon accident, is a case in point.

Public and political reaction to the devastating oil release in the Gulf has revitalized a coalition of environmental and anti-energy lobbies that oppose not only deep-water drilling, but all offshore oil production and, in some cases, all use of fossil fuels. As usual, political opportunists have been quick to seize the moment.

“You don’t want to let a good crisis get away,” declares Athan Manuel, director of lands protection in the Sierra Club’s legislative office. The organization is urging a permanent moratorium on new offshore drilling.

Kieran Suckling, executive director of the Center for Biological Diversity, disputes industry claims that shallow-water drilling is much safer than deep-water drilling. The center wants the existing six-month moratorium extended to all offshore drilling.

Such lobbying already has born fruit. On June 8, the administration issued new safety standards for shallow-water drilling. According to Bloomberg Businessweek, “as many as 50 shallow-water drilling rigs that employ about 5,000 workers may need new permits in the next six weeks under the administration’s new review.”

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Deflation is a concept many Americans have a tough time understanding.  They do understand the concept of Social Security.  As Federal budget deficits soaring, the public is being barraged by late night advertisements to buy gold as an inflationary hedge.  Unfortunately, the deflationary environment we are facing today is the biggest threat to the Social Security check Joe the Plumber is counting on for retirement.

The definition of deflation as a decrease in the general prices of goods and services may be simple, but a Google search for articles on deflation generates 3.5 million “hits”, versus a whopping 354 million “hits” for inflation.  This demonstrates that Americans are 100 to 1 more knowledgeable of inflation!

There have only been three bouts of deflation in the United States since its founding over 200 years ago. The first was the recession of 1836, when the currency in the United States contracted by about 30%.  The second was after 1865, when the Nation returned to a gold standard by retiring paper money printed during the Civil War.  The third period was the Great Depression, when prices and output fell by 25% from 1928 to 1933.  Very few Americans are familiar with the specifics of what happened during these periods, but they know it was a bad time for the “common man.”

Social Security was established during the Great Depression and continues to be the most important income stream for America’s seniors.  A large majority of the 16 million people over age 65 rely on Social Security for at least half of their income.  One-third of this group relies on Social Security for over 90% of their income.  Most retirees have come to rely on the annual cost-of-living increases in their check to make their life better.  In a deflationary environment we are facing today, few recipients are prepared for their check to actually shrink.

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